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Reviews
Noel Maurer. The Empire Trap: The Rise and Fall of U.S. Intervention to Protect 
American Property Overseas, 1893–2013. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2013. ix + 558 pp. ISBN 978-0-6911-5582-1, $39.50 (cloth).
In The Empire Trap: The Rise and Fall of U.S. Intervention to Protect 
American Property Overseas, 1893–2013, Noel Maurer attempts to “make 
concrete what was previously vague” (22) in the history of U.S. foreign 
policy. Specifically, Maurer explores the pattern of U.S.  government 
intervention to protect the overseas investments of American businesses 
when they were threatened, typically through acts of expropriation, 
by foreign governments. Maurer calls this pattern the empire trap, “in 
which one American administration’s promise to intervene on behalf of 
U.S. investors makes it harder for future administrations to refrain from 
such intervention” (8). The empire trap played out across two American 
empires. The first empire began with the Spanish–American War and 
Theodore Roosevelt’s 1904 declaration of the “Roosevelt Corollary” to 
the Monroe Doctrine and lasted through the early 1930s. This period 
was marked by the insertion of U.S. agents into foreign governments 
(primarily in Latin America) to oversee the collection and disbursement 
of local customs revenues to ensure the stability of government finance 
and the prompt and responsible payment of government debts. The sec-
ond empire, which largely overlapped with the Cold War, witnessed the 
U.S. government use covert action and economic sanctions (primarily 
in the form of restrictions on foreign aid) to ensure the fair treatment 
of U.S.  investors. Government intervention has ultimately been sup-
planted by international arbitration and other legal processes aimed at 
depoliticizing investments disputes.
The Empire Trap, as Maurer succinctly explains at the outset, 
advances “four basic findings.” First, “American government inter-
vention on behalf of U.S. foreign investors was astoundingly success-
ful at extracting compensation through the 1980s.” Even when the 
United States could not prevent or reverse acts of expropriation, in 
the vast majority of cases investors were provided fair compensation 
by expropriating governments as a result of U.S. intervention. Second, 
“American domestic interests trumped strategic concerns again and 
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again,” as successive presidential administrations, regardless of their 
ideological predilections, repeatedly pursued acts of intervention 
on behalf of investors whether those interventions advanced larger 
strategic interests or not. Third, “the United States proved unable to 
impose institutional reform in Latin America and West Africa even 
while American agents were in place, let alone afterward.” In all but 
one case, the fiscal receiverships and dollar diplomacy of the first 
empire failed to increase the collection of customs revenues, let alone 
produce long-term stability. Fourth, “the technology that the U.S. gov-
ernment used to protect American property rights overseas changed 
radically over time - and ultimately, in a case of unintended conse-
quences, gave U.S.  investors a set of tools that they could employ 
against foreign governments without explicitly calling on the power 
of the American executive to protect them” (2–3).
Maurer brings an impressive amount of data to the table in support 
of his four findings, providing a multitude of detailed examples span-
ning more than a century of global history to demonstrate the extent to 
which the U.S. government provided protection to American overseas 
investments. The government did much more to protect investments 
in natural resources (including oil) than it did in public utilities and 
other areas of economic activity, but the degree of intervention was sig-
nificant and has generally been overlooked as a coherent and consist-
ent feature of foreign policy. One of the great strengths of The Empire 
Trap is the depiction of the emergence of legal and arbitral processes 
to resolve investment disputes in the latter part of the twentieth cen-
tury. By exploring the development of these new tools of resolution 
in the context of the old method of government intervention, Maurer 
provides tremendous insight into the complexities and difficulties of 
creating a depoliticized system that could actually be successful.
At the end of the introduction, Maurer asserts the contributions 
that The Empire Trap makes to the disciplines of Political Science, 
Economics, and History. Political scientists, according to Maurer, have 
long noted the willingness of the U.S. government to go “to bat for 
American investors in conflicts with foreign states,” but they have “not 
fully recognized” how successful the U.S. government was “in obtain-
ing compensation for U.S. investors that equaled or exceeded the value 
of their investments as going concerns” (17). Economists, in Maurer’s 
estimation, have relied on “stylized facts - that is, facts accepted as 
true for the purpose of argument” for too long in their assessments of 
expropriation. The Empire Trap converts those stylized facts “into real 
facts, verified by data and evidence” that tells a different story about 
expropriation (20). In the field of History, Maurer upends the standard 
narrative on Latin American economic nationalism and offers a “new 
periodization of economic imperialism” (22–23).
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I suspect that assessments of The Empire Trap will be significantly 
shaped by the disciplinary perspective of its readers. As a historian 
of U.S. foreign policy, I felt that Maurer did not do enough to situate 
the empire trap within the larger geopolitical context confronting the 
United States, especially in 1904. The willingness of the McKinley 
and Roosevelt administrations to abandon a century of virtual isola-
tion in favor of empire in the Philippines and intervention in Latin 
America is only comprehensible within the context of the scramble for 
Africa and European imperialism in Asia (and the negative economic 
consequences both held for the United States), to say nothing of past 
European interventions in Latin America (something the United States 
had tried to ward off as early as 1823 with the Monroe Doctrine). All 
of this contributed to Roosevelt’s fear that irresponsibility on the part 
of Latin American governments could step off a wave of European 
imperialism and led to his decision to issue his Corollary and to set 
the empire trap in motion. Maurer is right to highlight the particular 
motivation of protecting the interests of American investors in Latin 
America, but this motivation is one piece of a much larger puzzle. 
Larger context aside, the empire trap thesis is exceptionally useful 
at highlighting and explaining the longevity of American interven-
tion in Latin America and Liberia before the Great Depression. As a 
fully coherent theoretical framework explaining government action 
throughout the twentieth century, though, it does not hold up as well. 
During the Cold War, U.S. interventions were primarily motivated by 
curbing the spread of Communism, or were generally limited to the 
use of economic sanctions to secure adequate financial settlements 
for American investors. While the U.S. government sought to protect 
American overseas investments throughout the twentieth century, it 
was never clear that the empire trap itself was the motivating factor 
behind these efforts during Maurer’s second empire.
Despite these weaknesses, The Empire Trap represents an impor-
tant addition to scholarship on twentieth century U.S. foreign policy. 
Maurer convincingly demonstrates that American investments in 
foreign countries were repeatedly threatened by expropriating gov-
ernments and that in countless instances the United States utilized 
a variety of methods to protect those investments or to ensure fair 
compensation when they were lost. Maurer’s four findings generally 
hold true, even if the empire trap thesis itself is less persuasive once 
the first American empire came to an end.
Jeffrey Malanson 
Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne
doi:10.1093/es/khu032
Advance Access publication June 28, 2014
